A-SMGCS VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION RESULTS FROM THE PROJECT EMMA (LEVEL 1&2)

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Abstract

A-SMGCS is a modular system defined in the ICAO Manual on Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) [8]. Such systems aim to “maintain the declared surface movement rate under all weather conditions within the aerodrome visibility operational level (AVOL) while maintaining the required level of safety” [8]. With the complete concept of an A-SMGCS, air traffic controllers (ATCO), flight crews, and vehicles drivers are assisted with surface operations in terms of surveillance, control, routing/planning and guidance tasks. To harmonise the implementation of the first two levels of A-SMGCS, which focus on surveillance and conflict monitoring, and to further mature the necessary technology and operating procedures, the European Commission funded the project EMMA (European airport Movement Management by A-SMGCS) within the sixth framework programme. Within EMMA, A-SMGCS level 1&2 systems were installed at three European mid-size airports: Milan-Malpensa, Prague-Ruzyně, and Toulouse-Blagnac. Technical and operational trials were conducted at all three sites to verify the technical performance against the requirements and to prove operational feasibility. Additionally, real-time simulations were performed in order to tune parameters of the monitoring and alerting function and to also assess operational improvements under experimental conditions. The paper presents the EMMA validation approach, the main findings and results as well as lessons learnt.

Introduction

Following the EUROCONTROL Performance Review Report of 2005 [5] airport delays are a growing proportion of the total ATM delays. Nearly all European hubs and already some mid-size airports are on the list of the 15 most penalising airports in Europe, which together generate 77% of all airport ATFM delays.

Extending existing airport infrastructure, e.g. by building new runways, is a very difficult and complex process associated with many restrictions. Therefore, the optimal usage of existing infrastructure more and more becomes a necessity. Despite the importance of optimal resource usage, flight deck operations on the ground are still not very sophisticated nowadays. Implementation of modern cockpit technology for surface operations lags behind the developments for other flight phases. “Seen and be seen” is still the most common practice on ground. After landing pilots have to navigate using paper maps and look out of the window to avoid other traffic. Above that ATCOs are performing the surveillance task mainly visually. Frequently, ATCOs are supported by surface movement radar (SMR) only giving them poor analogue radar plots with a lot of clutter and nuisance targets. As soon as the visual reference is impaired all surface operations are severely impacted by an increasing workload and a decreasing situation awareness of all participants, compromising safety and airport capacity and increasing delays. This leads to negative consequences for the approach areas and finally to unfavourable network effects in the overall air transport system.

An A-SMGCS helps to overcome this poor situation. In its basic level 1 it provides the ATCOs with a display showing the complete traffic situation that includes the position of all aircraft and vehicle movements and their identification. Since it is assumed that each day in the US and Europe at least one runway incursion is occurring, which may lead to severe accidents, such as the Milan-Linate accident in 2001, in its level 2 the A-SMGCS provides the ATCO with an automatic runway incursion monitoring and alerting function.

EMMA Project Background

The EMMA integrated project is divided into two project phases (EMMA & EMMA2) and is set within the Sixth Framework Program of the European Commission Directorate General for Energy and Transport (DG-TREN). It looks at A-SMGCS as a holistic approach for changes in airport operations. It builds on the experiences of earlier projects such as ‘Operational Benefit Evaluation by Testing A-SMGCS’ (BETA) [11]. With BETA new technologies for data extraction, digitising, data fusion, data link and multilateration became available. Although A-SMGCS progressed from a demonstration status to a semi-operational system, the complete proof of benefit of A-SMGCS was missing. Therefore, EMMA was launched to set the standards for A-SMGCS systems and their
operational usage, safety and interoperability while also focussing on the benefit expectations.

**EMMA A-SMGCS Services (level 1&2)**

A complete A-SMGCS as described in [8] supports tower controllers, apron/ramp controllers, pilots, and vehicle drivers in an all-embracing manner with the following four functions: surveillance, control, routing/planning, and guidance. EMMA validation activities in their first phase focussed on the first two implementation levels, which correspond to a surveillance service and a runway safety net. These services currently have the highest level of maturity:

- **Surveillance (level 1)**
  Each individual aircraft is seamlessly tracked and identified from final approach until it reaches the parking position and, vice versa, from the gate or stand until leaving the CTR.

- **Runway monitoring and alerting function (level 2)**
  The level 2 implementation looks at an automated control service that helps controllers to detect potentially dangerous conflicts on runways and restricted area intrusions. The clear advantage of this approach is that it is pro-active and not reactive. Preventing conflicts before they get imminent is obviously better than solving them under time pressure when they become obvious.

**EMMA Test Sites**

A level 1&2 A-SMGCS system was installed at three European mid-size airports: Milan-Malpensa, Toulouse-Blagnac, and Prague-Ruzyně (cf. Figure 1). Multi sensor systems integrating ASR, SMR, MLAT, ADS-B, and special gap-fillers were installed and tuned at all sites. With Milan and Toulouse operational shadow-mode trials were performed, whereas the ATCOs in Prague could even use the system within their regular working environment. A-SMGCS displays showing the complete traffic situation were installed at each controller working position. Controllers were trained and certified to use the system fully operational in all visibility conditions. Therefore, debriefing interviews with Prague controllers provided the most valid results.

Additionally, three real-time simulation trials were conducted with Milan-Malpensa and Prague controllers. This was necessary for tuning parameters of the monitoring and alerting function to the controllers’ needs and also assessing operational improvements under experimental conditions.

SSR Mode-S transponder and ADS-B equipped test cars and test aircraft were used to tune and finally verify the technical performance of both the surveillance system and the safety net.

**Figure 1: Milan-Malpensa, Toulouse-Blagnac, and Prague Ruzyně from the bird’s perspective**

**EMMA Verification & Validation Methodology testing an A-SMGCS**

Verification and validation (V&V) activities in the first phase of EMMA were based on the methodological approach described by the ‘Master European Validation Plan’ (MAEVA) project in its Validation Guideline Handbook (VGH) [14]. Despite the general acceptance of the VGH within the ATM community, several adaptations of the methodological framework were proposed in Europe concentrating on the initial approach to validation activities and the related life cycle of the concept or technology to be validated. EUROCONTROL together with the “Co-operative Approach to Air Traffic Services” (CAATS) project team consolidated all change proposals in the first edition of their “European Operational Concept Validation Methodology” document, E-OCVM for short [12], which currently is the mandatory methodological framework for concept validation within the European ATM community.

EMMA liaised closely with both the MAEVA and the CAATS project teams. The European Commission installed the CAATS project with the
The basic aim of phase 1 of the EMMA project was the V&V of A-SMGCS (level 1&2) functionality as described in the ICAO Manual [8] and further refined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of EMMA [3], which bases on the technical and operational functionality outlined in the official documents of the EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS project [1], [2].

Before successful V&V takes place, verification, i.e. testing against system specifications should occur. Only if verification results in an A-SMGCS that performs at the required level, successful validation of the concept can be started.

- **Verification** is testing against predefined technical requirements, (“did we build the system right?”).
- **Validation** is testing against operational requirements (“did we build the right system?”).

With EMMA V&V was split into four sub-stages [15]. These are illustrated in the figure below.

![Figure 2: Stages of EMMA V&V activities](image)

The **Operational Improvements** stage refers to evidence of the operational improvements, in terms of Safety, Capacity, Efficiency, and Human Factors, using the equipment and the procedures defined in the previous stage. It answers the question: “Given the accepted A-SMGCS equipment and procedures, how is ATM performance improved?”

The **Operational Benefits** stage refers to the translation of operational improvements into terms of economical benefits. It answers the question: “What are the economic benefits for the purchasers and users of A-SMGCS products?”. This translation of operational effects into monetary values was out of the scope of EMMA and should be carried out by the respective stakeholders, since they are in a better position to do so.

In general, it can be expected that the validation exercises will demonstrate the operational feasibility of the A-SMGCS operational concept and that the concept provides a solution to the specific ATM problem and leads to operational improvements when comparing it to current SMGCS.

**Test Platforms**

Real-time simulations (RTS) focus on the operational feasibility of the monitoring and alert function. The simulation test platform can be used ideally to evoke safety critical events and to tune the system alerts to the needs of the ATCOs. In addition, operational improvements in terms of safety and efficiency gains can be proved with an RTS platform.

On-site, V&V activities concentrate on the measurement of the technical performance by using test cars and/or automatic performance assessment tools. Operational feasibility of the whole system is subject of investigations with participation of the end users. Measuring operational improvements in the field, however, is very difficult or even impossible. Frequently, both users of the system and the system itself are not certified for full operational use. Furthermore, a valid baseline with ceteris paribus condition compared to the experimental condition (with A-SMGCS) does not exist. Weather, traffic mix, traffic amount or the runway in use change frequently and cannot easily be controlled by the test co-ordinator. Any effects of an operational improvement are then overshadowed. However, if field trials show that the overall system meets the technical performance and is operationally feasible, then operational improvements, which are measured in the RTS, can be transferred to the real environment.
**Results**

Toulouse-Blagnac and Milan-Malpensa evaluated the A-SMGCS in on-site shadow-mode trials, which revealed important feedback to the technical and operational performance. Prague Ruzyně already started implementing an A-SMGCS within the BETA project, so that implementation and tuning of the system could start from a more matured level in EMMA. During the EMMA project Prague achieved the breakthrough to use the A-SMGCS fully operational under all visibility conditions. At the time of the validation activities, Prague controllers had already used the A-SMGCS for more than seven months and thus could give very detailed feedback regarding its operational feasibility and operational improvements. Therefore, validation results described in this paper mainly concentrate on results obtained at Prague Airport.

**Technical tests**

The EMMA A-SMGCS system at the test site airports consisted of a combination of hardware and software components together with the pre-existing infrastructure. The following main components already existed or had to be installed:

- SMR + extractor, MLAT, and ASR
- MLAT/ADS-B processing system
- Flight data processing system (FDPS)
- Surveillance data server (SDS)
- Technical control and monitoring system
- Recording and playback system
- A-SMGCS controller working positions (CWP)
- Coverage gap-filler system, e.g. video sensors
- Vehicles equipped with Mode S squitter beacons
- Aerodrome ground lighting system

The most important technical performance requirements were to be assessed with the help of 18 verification indicators (see Table 1). These indicators were derived from the EMMA technical and operational requirement documents [6] [3], which again were based on the A-SMGCS ICAO Manual [8] and the EUROCAE ED-87A [4].

The verification tests also aimed at assessing the long-term quality of the surveillance and conflict detection performance. These long-term measurements were performed by the recording and analysis tool MOGADOR, which was developed within EMMA (as described in [13]). The MOGADOR tool is a new verification tool, which fully automatically analyses specific performance parameters from a long-term recorded data pool of regular airport traffic. This tool revealed interesting results that can also be used to tune and adapt the A-SMGCS to meet the operational performance needs. However, long-term results analysed with MOGADOR lacked maturity because time was not sufficient to fully adapt the MOGADOR algorithm to the specific test airport characteristics, which would be necessary to automatically measure the real system performance.

Prior to the long-term assessment, technical short-term tests were performed in order to assess the readiness of the A-SMGCS system and to verify the system’s compliance with the technical requirements (EMMA TRD [6]) by visual observation. Short-term test procedures leaned on EUROCAE [4] but were also adapted and improved within EMMA.

In Table 1 short- and long-term results of the technical performance tests carried out at Prague Airport are compared with the respective requirements.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Measured Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-1</td>
<td>Coverage Volume</td>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Approach Manoeuv. area Apron</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-2</td>
<td>Probability of Detection</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>≥ 99.9%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-3</td>
<td>Probability of False Detection</td>
<td>PFD</td>
<td>&lt; 10E-3 per Reported Target</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-4</td>
<td>Reference Point</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Not defined</td>
<td>2-20 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-5</td>
<td>Reported Position Accuracy</td>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>≤ 7.5 m at a conf. level of 95%</td>
<td>3.2 m (static)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-6</td>
<td>Reported Position Resolution</td>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>≤ 1 m</td>
<td>0.1 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-7</td>
<td>Reported Position Discrimination</td>
<td>RPD</td>
<td>Not defined</td>
<td>Not tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-8</td>
<td>Reported Velocity Accuracy</td>
<td>RVA</td>
<td>Speed: ≤5m/s Direction: ≤10° at 95% conf.</td>
<td>1.2 m/s 7.9°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For the technical results of the other sites and decisions about all other technical requirements the interested reader is referred to the EMMA V&V Analysis Report [16].
### Table 1: Summary of Technical Verification Results (PRG)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Measured Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-9</td>
<td>Probability of Identification</td>
<td>PID</td>
<td>≥ 99.9% for identifiable targets</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-10</td>
<td>Probability of False Identification</td>
<td>PFID</td>
<td>&lt; 10E-3 per Reported Target</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-11</td>
<td>Target Report Update Rate</td>
<td>TRUR</td>
<td>≤ 1 s</td>
<td>0.47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-12</td>
<td>Probability of Detection of an Alert Situation</td>
<td>PDAS</td>
<td>≥ 99.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-13</td>
<td>Probability of False Alert</td>
<td>PFA</td>
<td>&lt; 10E-3 per Alert</td>
<td>Insufficient data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-14</td>
<td>Alert Response Time</td>
<td>ART</td>
<td>≤ 0.5 s</td>
<td>&lt;0.5 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-15</td>
<td>Routing Process Time</td>
<td>RPT</td>
<td>≤ 10 s</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-16</td>
<td>Probability of Continuous Track</td>
<td>PCT</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-17</td>
<td>Matrix of Detection</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE-18</td>
<td>Matrix of Identification</td>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational feasibility**

The operational feasibility tests aimed at assessing the ATCOs’ acceptance of the EMMA operational procedures and requirements. It was expected that the operational feasibility of the system would be confirmed under all visibility conditions by using the procedures defined in the EMMA ORD [3]. The operational feasibility was assessed in RTS and on-site.

**Real-time simulations**

In the Prague simulations a total of 11 ATCOS in four groups participated in the RTS trials. Three traffic scenarios were generated in accordance with the three different visibility conditions (VIS1, VIS2, and VIS3), (cf. Table 2).

### Table 2: Traffic Scenarios with Prague RTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario A</th>
<th>Scenario B</th>
<th>Scenario C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RWY QFU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>↑24 ↓31</td>
<td>↑24 ↓24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILS CAT I</td>
<td>VOR/DME</td>
<td>ILS CAT II/III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather conditions</td>
<td>VIS2</td>
<td>VIS1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>Day</td>
<td>Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind 350/10</td>
<td>Wind 130/15</td>
<td>Wind 350/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visibility</td>
<td>visibility</td>
<td>VRB/2 RVR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2km</td>
<td>5km</td>
<td>400m visib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~ 35 / h</td>
<td>~ 41 / h</td>
<td>~ 25 / h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the 11 ANS-CR ATCOS was given a 30-item acceptance questionnaire after finishing all test runs. The Questionnaire mainly addressed the use of the A-SMGCS HMI and new procedures, but also included items to the performance of the runway monitoring and alerting function. The answering scale reached from 1 “strongly disagree” to 10 “strongly agree”. Except for two items all statements were answered towards the expected end of the scale and a t-test with an error probability of \( \alpha = 0.05 \) proved their significance\(^2\). Therefore, it can be stated that the use of the A-SMGCS HMI and the performance of automatic alerts were of high operational feasibility in the Prague RTS.

RTS for the Milan-Malpensa environment were performed at the NARSIM-Tower simulator of NLR in Amsterdam. The experiments also focussed on verifying technical performance and evaluating operational improvements (summarised later in this paper) related to the integration of a Runway Incursion Alerting (RIA) system into the current operational environment (baseline scenario). The ad hoc validation plan described both nominal and non-nominal validation sessions. The experiment scenarios discerned three major conditions: Medium or high-level traffic volumes, under different visibility conditions (VIS-1 and

\(^2\) The complete results can be found in the Prague Test Report D6.3.1 [9].
VIS-2), and with or without support of an A-SMGCS. Feasibility checks with ENAV controllers in RTS had to confirm the pre-configured system parameters and indicate unexpected behaviour of the tool or malfunctions in order to ensure that the installed system was fit for more performance-oriented validation activities.

Field trials

During the EMMA operational field trials in Prague a total of 15 ANS-CR ATCOs filled in the debriefing questionnaire. All 15 ATCOs had worked with the A-SMGCS for more than seven months at the time of the interviews. A debriefing questionnaire with 144 items was handed out after their regular shift. 98 of the 144 items referred to the “operational feasibility” questions/statements, which were segregated into five areas:

- General usability
- Surveillance service
- Control service
- HMI design
- Procedures

The items could be answered on a scale from 1 (disagreement) to 6 (agreement). One-sample t-tests with an expected mean value of 3.5 and an error probability of $\alpha = 0.05$ were applied to prove statistical significance for all 144 items.

The results revealed that the controllers accepted the A-SMGCS and thus approved its “operational feasibility”. The following statements were confirmed by the ATCOs with statistical significance (all results to be found in [9]):

- **VA-03 Surveillance:** “When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the aircraft on the taxiways is accurate enough to exercise control in a safe and efficient way.” (Mean ($M$) = 5.4; $p = 0.00^*$), or

- **VA-16 Surveillance:** “I think that the A-SMGCS surveillance display could be used to determine that an aircraft has vacated the runway.” ($M = 5.3; \ p = 0.00^*$), or

- **VA-79 Control:** “The information displayed in the A-SMGCS is helpful for avoiding conflicts.” ($M = 5.1; \ p = 0.00^*$), or

- **VA-75 HMI:** “The A-SMGCS provides the right information at the right time.” ($M = 5.1; \ p = 0.00^*$), or

- **VA-55 Procedures:** “When visual reference is not possible I think the A-SMGCS surveillance display can be used to determine if the runway is cleared to issue a landing clearance.” ($M = 5.3; \ p = 0.00^*$)

Most of the significant VA items refer to the surveillance service of the A-SMGCS, because the controllers have not used operationally the full scope of a monitoring and alerting function yet but only the “stop bar crossing” alerts as a first step. However, flight tests with test aircraft, which were used to evoke additional conflict situations (e.g. arrival-arrival conflicts with crossing runway), showed that also the performance of other conflict situation alerts was highly accepted by the controllers during the field trials.

Operational improvements

With EMMA, high-level and low-level V&V objectives were formulated and translated into measurable indicators. Table 3 gives an overview of the operational improvements that were intended to be measured with real-time simulation exercises. The ATCOs worked alternately with A-SMGCS and with their current SMGCS, which served as the baseline condition. By comparison of those two test conditions, operational improvements of the A-SMGCS could be assessed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-level Objective</th>
<th>Low-level Objective</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Reduced number of</td>
<td>Number of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>incidents and</td>
<td>incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accidents</td>
<td>accidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faster identification</td>
<td>Time for conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and mitigation of</td>
<td>detection, identification,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>safety hazards</td>
<td>resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency/</td>
<td>Lower Taxi Time</td>
<td>Taxi Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>for in and outbound</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>traffic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Factors</td>
<td>Lower duration of</td>
<td>Duration of radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>radio com</td>
<td>communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(R/T load)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convenient level of</td>
<td>Workload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>workload</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Measurements in RTS

In the following the most interesting results are reported in accordance to the abovementioned indicators (cf. Table 3):

**Number of incidents and accidents**

No accidents were observed during the RTS trials. Incidents occurred but they were caused by the pseudo-pilots and thus were not human errors in terms of ATCO mistakes. In general, natural ATCO errors are very rare and thus hard to assess in test trials.

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3 A star (*) signals statistical significance with $p < 0.05$. 
Time for conflict detection, identification, and resolution

The reaction time was assessed by an observer who measured the time between the initiation of a conflict and the reaction of the ATCO in charge. The reaction of an ATCO was defined by the time when the ATCO contacts the pilots to resolve the conflict. Pilots in the simulation were not real pilots but pseudo-pilots. They were instructed to cause conflict situations.

Prague RTS results showed an improvement of 11.5% in the ‘reaction time’ of the Tower Executive Controller (TEC) between A-SMGCS and the baseline condition even if statistical significance (M = -0.69 seconds, T(12) = -0.560, p > 0.05) could not be achieved. However, an important trend was discovered that showed that ATCOs react faster in the A-SMGCS condition (cf. Figure 3).

Figure 3: ATCO’s reaction time in case of conflict situations

The most important conclusion of the Malpensa RTS was that the expected benefit of the RIA tool regarding the decrease of detection time and total conflict duration was reached only under low visibility conditions (VIS-2). For the rest, no significant impacts of the advanced system on the resolution time were identified for either of the visibility conditions.

Taxi Time

The taxi time was measured automatically for each aircraft starting from the gate (velocity > 0 kts) until the wheels left the ground (take-off) for outbound movements. For inbound movements the time measurement started when the wheels touched the ground (touch down) until the velocity was 0 at the gate or stand. Since identical traffic scenarios were used for A-SMGCS and baseline trials, pairs of identical taxiing aircraft within identical traffic scenarios could be generated. This procedure guaranteed that measured taxi time differences could be attributed to better efficiency of A-SMGCS.

With Prague RTS, pairs of “taxi times” were summed up for each scenario A, B, and C and separated in A-SMGCS and baseline condition. The results showed significant differences in the taxi times between A-SMGCS and the baseline condition: $M_{\text{Total}} = -30 \text{ seconds}$, $T_{(178)} = 1.973$, $p < 0.05$. This mean value corresponds to an effect of 5.5%.

Figure 4: Average taxi times

Since the aircraft, controlled by pseudo-pilots, always have a constant speed level, those taxi time differences can only be interpreted as being caused by a more efficient control by the ATCOs using A-SMGCS. The detailed results also revealed that the taxi time effect is particularly high with scenario B (nearly 18%) where visibility is good but the amount of traffic is the largest. Finally, it must be stated: Yes, A-SMGCS reduces taxi times.

Duration of radio communications

The duration of radio communication was measured for each controller working position, Tower planning-, Tower executive-, and ground executive controller (TPC, TEC, and GEC). The durations refer to 3600 seconds overall test time. Figure 5 outlines the respective results.

Figure 5: Duration of radio communication for three controller working positions

A two-way 2x3 ANOVA shows a difference of 162 seconds between A-SMGCS and baseline, which shows a positive trend but did not become significant ($F(1, 30) = 3.6, p > 0.05$). However, a p-
value of 0.06 is rather close to significance and with a greater sample size the effect should be proven.

**Situation awareness (SA)**

After each test run the ATCO’s situation awareness was measured with the SASHA questionnaire. The questionnaire uses a five-point scale and contains 12 questions, of which the last one addresses SA globally: "How would you rate your overall situation awareness during this exercise?" All ratings were merged into two scores per controller, one for the A-SMGCS and one for the baseline condition (cf. Figure 6).

![SASHA Item 12](image)

**Figure 6: ATCOs’ Situation Awareness**

A t-test with repeated measurements showed the significance of this expected result ($T_{(10)} = 3.0$, $p < 0.05$): Yes, A-SMGCS increases the ATCOs situation awareness.

**Workload**

In every test run each ATCO was asked to indicate the perceived workload rating every 10 minutes. The controller could choose one of five categories: underutilised, relaxed, comfortable, high, or excessive. The mean values were analysed in a 2x3 (A-SMGCS x Scenario) ANOVA with repeated measurements on all independent factors. The ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of A-SMGCS ($F_{(1,10)} = 0.019; p = 0.89$) with a mean of $M = 2.285$ compared to the baseline mean of $M = 2.276$ on a scale reaching from 1 to 5. Most of the time the controllers felt relaxed and comfortable in the simulation runs, notwithstanding the test condition A-SMGCS or baseline. Traffic scenarios were not demanding enough to put stress on the controllers, not even in the baseline condition. Therefore, A-SMGCS had no chance of showing a workload reduction.

**Debriefing interviews in the control Tower**

Because of the laboratory conditions of a simulation platform, operational improvements were mainly assessed there. Nevertheless operational improvements could also be deduced from interviews with active A-SMGCS controllers after their regular shifts. The Prague ATCOs were asked to estimate their perceived safety and efficiency when they worked with A-SMGCS compared to earlier times when they could not use the new system. As already outlined above, a questionnaire containing 144 items was handed out to the ATCOs. 46 items referred to operational improvements in terms of safety, efficiency, and human factors.

In the following, an excerpt of the most interesting answers to the 46 items is given. The answering scale reached from 1 (disagreement) to 6 (agreement):

- **VA-28 Safety:** “When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to operate safer.” ($M = 5.4; p = 0.00*$), or
- **VA-62 Safety:** “I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect or prevent runway incursions.” ($M = 5.0; p = 0.00*$), or
- **VA-09 Efficiency:** “When visual reference is not possible, I think identifying an aircraft or vehicle is more efficient when using the surveillance display.” ($M = 5.2; p = 0.00*$), or
- **VA-10 Efficiency:** “I think, also in good visibility conditions, identifying an aircraft or vehicle is even more efficient when using the surveillance display.” ($M = 5.2; p = 0.00*$), or
- **VA-28 Efficiency:** “The A-SMGCS enables me to execute my tasks more efficiently.” ($M = 5.4; p = 0.00*$), or
- **VA-28 Efficiency:** “The number of position reports will be reduced when using A-SMGCS (e.g. aircraft vacating runway-in-use).” ($M = 5.4; p = 0.00*$), or
- **VA-124 Efficiency:** “The A-SMGCS display gives me a better situational awareness.” ($M = 4.5; p = 0.00*$), or
- **VA-12 Human Factors:** “The A-SMGCS enables me to handle more traffic when visual reference is not possible.” ($M = 5.4; p = 0.00*$), or

Additionally, ATCOs from Toulouse-Blagnac and Milan Malpensa, which were interviewed after shadow-mode trials, had an overall positive feeling about the ability of A-SMGCS to improve operations (see also [16]).

All those examples further support the hypothesis that A-SMGCS provides significant operational improvements that will result in operational benefits for all stakeholders of an A-SMGCS.

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5 For the complete results, please have a look at the EMMA V&V Analysis report [16].
Lessons Learnt

The following summarising statements contain the most important recommendations obtained from the EMMA project (cf. also the EMMA Recommendation Report [10]):

- The use of a standardised and well proven validation approach is required for achieving reliable and robust V&V results. The use of the MAEVA VGH [14] with its stepped evaluation view within EMMA V&V contributed substantially to the production of reliable validation results. In future validation projects, the European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM, [12]) should be consulted as well.

- Some performance requirements are difficult to measure and verify by short-term testing only. Results are highly dependent on the measurement method and there are significant temporal variations. The EMMA tests indicate that verification of such requirements calls for continuous long-term observation over a period of several weeks. Automatic assessment tools, like MOGADOR (see above), may help here.

- It was found that the most useful means of assessing surveillance detection capability and coverage is to plot target position reports onto an aerodrome map over a period of time. This method clearly identifies areas with gaps in coverage and areas where false reports occur.

- Due to a high number of site specificities extensive tuning is a compulsory step to obtain a sufficient and reliable system performance.

- It was proven that the ATCOs can use the A-SMGCS surveillance display as a primary means for identification, as it provides an identification label for every Mode-S equipped aircraft.

- It is recognised that flight crews do not comply with the transponder operating procedures consistently even when they are published by AIS and are known to the airlines. One of the main reasons could be the non-standardised symbolism applied to the transponder control panels in cockpit of all kinds of manufacturers. It is recommended to include type specific procedures in the pre-flight preparation procedures/checklists and in the aircraft operations manual to further improve pilots’ compliancy.

- In order to use the surveillance display safely and efficiently in all visibility conditions, all aircraft and vehicle movements, that intend to get authorised to use the manoeuvring area, should be properly equipped to be co-operative to an A-SMGCS in order to provide their identity on the ATCO’s surveillance display.

- The tuning of a runway monitoring and alerting function in simulation before running it operationally is a compulsory step to assure its operational feasibility in terms of safety and efficiency.

Conclusion and Outlook

EMMA phase 1 was a project, which was founded to set the last bricks in the wall of a validated and consolidated A-SMGCS level 1&2 concept for support of harmonised, worldwide implementation. This effort was performed in close co-ordination with EUROCONTROL’s A-SMGCS project being based on a common level 1&2 concept. Within EMMA, level 1&2 systems were implemented at three European mid-size airports to perform extensive trials leading to meaningful results, which should further support, improve, and finally validate the existing concept.

The authors of this paper do not attempt to fully cover all facets of the EMMA activities but they try to provide an overview of the EMMA strategy and the most meaningful project results. At three test sites the system performance was measured and verified against ICAO [8] requirements. System performance and new procedures were assessed for their operational feasibility and their effects on operational improvements. Finally, all results yielded feedback for ICAO requirements (see EMMA V&V analysis report [16] for the complete feedback).

The mentioned results regarding operational feasibility and improvements were obtained in real-time simulations and field trials. Simulation experiments proved the feasibility of new procedures, the A-SMGCS HMI, and the runway monitoring and alerting function. They showed operational improvements in terms of a lower duration of radio communication, a faster ATCO reaction time in case of conflict situations, an improved situation awareness of the ATCOs, and a significant reduction of the average taxi times.

Standardised interviews with active ATCOs using the A-SMGCS at Prague airport confirmed the operational improvements. These significant answers are further supported by feedback from the shadow-mode trials with ATCOs in Toulouse-Blagnac and Milan Malpensa who estimated that A-SMGCS provides significant operational
improvements. Those improvements with more efficient and safer surface operations will finally result in operational benefits for all stakeholders of an airport and will provide important input for an A-SMGCS business case.

EUROCONTROL in co-operation with the European Commission presented results of EMMA and the EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS project to the European Air Navigation Planning Group (EANPG). They presented a formal proposal to update the ICAO A-SMGCS manual [8] and to amend the Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS) (Doc 7030, [7]). These activities are still ongoing.

References

Abbreviations
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveilliance Broadcast
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
AIS Aeronautical Information Service
ANOVA Analysis of Variance
ANS-CR Air Navigation Services of the Czech Republic
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
ASR Approach Surveillance Radar
ATCO Air traffic controller
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management
ATM Air Traffic Management
AVOL Aerodrome visibility operational level
BETA operational Benefit Evaluation by Testing A-SMGCS
CEC Clearance Executive Controller
CTR Control Tower Region
CWP Controller Working Position
DG-TREN Directorate General Transport and Energy
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt
EANPG European Air Navigation Planning Group
EMMA European airport Movement Management by A-SMGCS
GEC Ground Executive Controller
GND Ground
HMI Human Machine Interface
ILS Instrumental Landing System
M Mean
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Keywords

A-SMGCS, Airport Airside Management, Surface Operations, Operational Trials, Verification, Validation, Human Factors, EMMA, FP6, ATM

Biography

Jörn Jakobi received his diploma in psychology from the University of Göttingen in the year 1999. Since 2000 he is as a human factors expert with DLR institute of flight guidance where he worked in the domain of airport airside traffic management with the focus on A-SMGCS operations and validation. He was coordinating operational trials or performance analyses at diverse European airports in multi-national research projects, like TARMAC or BETA. With the sixth framework ‘integrated project’ EMMA he was managing the subproject “concept” with 17 European partners from the industry, R&D organisations, airlines and ANSPs and was responsible for all Prague airport related validation activities.

Jürgen Teutsch studied mechanical engineering with a major in aerospace engineering at the Technical University of Aachen (RWTH) and obtained his academic degree with a final examination on GPS-data post-processing carried out at the Faculty of Aerospace Engineering of Delft University of Technology (TUD), the Netherlands, in 1995. After his studies he was involved in a research programme on computer simulation studies of re-entry space-vehicles at TUD. He later worked as a computer consultant for LogicaCMG in Amstelveen, the Netherlands, and as software engineer at the structural dynamics department of EADS Airbus in Hamburg, Germany, before joining the National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands (NLR) in 2000 as manager for ATM simulation projects. Since then he has been involved in several multi-national research initiatives in the area of ATM and airport technologies, among which the most prominent are AFAS, Gate-to-Gate, C-ATM, and EMMA. As validation specialist for the NLR ATC Research Simulator (NARSIM), he has also been involved in the development of the European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM).